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Hume’s Counterpoint. A Chapter on Property.
by Ekkehart Schlicht
Abstract
David Hu m e  offers two separate lines of argument in order to establish 
the principles that govern ownership. The one is instrumental and seeks to 
understand property by looking at its contribution to individual advantage 
and social welfare, or “publick utility”. The other is psychological. It takes 
the phenomena of property as arising from “imagination”. The following 
essay discusses this parallelism.
The paper is adapted from a chapter of a book I am currently writing and 
illustrates the approach taken in that book.
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Hume’s Counterpoint. A Chapter on Property.
by Ekkehart Schlicht*
A Tension
The system of property rights is, in any society, fundamental for many kinds of 
economic and social transactions. These systems are largely rooted in custom, 
although modem societies have added separate legal systems that shape and re-shape 
property rights in a centralist manner, rather unrelated to custom.
The focus in this chapter is on the customary aspects of property. I shall try to explain 
how property is shaped by custom, and how market processes relate to this. It will be 
argued that the modem theory of property rights will lose much of its arbitrary nature 
if the presence of indispensable psychological elements is explicitly acknowledged. 
The clarification processes that mold custom, shape property rights in much the same 
manner. They render the system of rights responsive to outside influences, like 
economic incentives and competitive forces. At the same time, they constrain the set 
of feasible arrangements. In this way, a consideration of the psychological aspects of 
property formation will sharpen the insights that can be obtained from the approaches 
pursued in the new institutional economics and will help us to better understand the 
limits o f competitive forces in shaping and redefining property rights.
This largely instrumental view of property has been repeatedly challenged by authors 
who stress self-developmental aspects, morality, the cultural significance and the 
political aspect of property.* 1 The tension between moral and instrumental views of 
property has indeed always been with us. It shows up in public opinion as well as in 
learned writings. It ignites the hottest debates, but the discussion is mainly conducted 
by restating one’s own position.2
* This is a chapter of a manuscript written during my sabbatical at the Graduate School of 
Management at the University of Melbourne (SCHLICHT in preparation). I thank the school for 
providing an outstanding research environment, and many colleagues for the kind interest they took 
in my work. Philip Williams and Harry Stanton made very valuable suggestions. Particular thanks 
go to Eric Jones who encouraged me to undertake the project of writing the book over many years, 
and who helped me with detailed, penetrating, and constructive criticism of this chapter. He 
managed to do so without frustrating me entirely; this is remarkable. The Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft has provided a travel grant to pursue this research.
1 Ry a n  (1984), Wa l t z e r  (1983)
2 Ry a n  (1984), in a book devoted exclusively to property, does not touch the economics of property 
rights and declares under the entry of "property” in the authoritative New Palgrave: “The least 
abashed intellectual heirs of the 18th and 19th-century utilitarianism are the defenders of the so- 
called ‘economic theory of property rights’.” (Ry a n  1987:1031). In the subsequent -  and otherwise 
most penetrating — entry “property rights,” Al c h ia n  (1987:1032) mentions that issues about social 
acceptability are due to misunderstanding the market process.
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Borrowing From Hume
We may try to approach that tension in a constructive way by exploring how systems 
of property rights emerge, and why they carry these conflicting convictions with them. 
It will be argued that the conflicting convictions are brought about by the same human 
tendencies that contribute to the formation and stabilization of property rights in the 
first place.
Borrowing From HUME
The view of property that I am going to present may be understood as a rather 
straightforward elaboration of David Hu m e ’s chapter on property in the Treatise o f 
Human Nature.3 This renders it convenient to follow Hu m e  closely and inject, at 
some critical junctures of the argument, doses of “clarity” .
I shall build up the argument by citing Hu m e  extensively. These citations are not 
intended to document that I can cite an authority in favor of my views whom others 
cannot easily match. Rather, Hu m e ’s observations form an integral part of the entire 
argument. It is only at a very few minor points that I disagree with Hu m e , and I note 
those.
There are two reasons that induce me to couch the argument in Hu m e ’s own words. 
The first is, that HUME has found a way to express the central ideas I am trying to 
defend in a way that can hardly be surpassed in clarity and terseness, certainly not by 
me. He uses another wording and terminology to describe the regularities I am 
concerned with, and this other perspective will add another dimension. The second 
reason for citing Hu m e  so extensively is the staggering fact that one of the great 
classical economists, the father of British associativism and grandfather of 
utilitarianism, could equally well pass as the father of Gestalt ideas, or the grandfather 
of modem cognitivism. This observation is quite unrelated to my argument, but it 
seems worth mentioning.4 Yet nobody would believe such an affirmation, and so it 
seems expedient to let Hu m e  speak for himself.
Hu m e ’s Counterpoint
Hu m e  offers two separate lines of argumentation in order to establish the principles 
that govern ownership. The one is instrumental and seeks to understand property by 
looking at its contribution to individual advantage and social welfare, or “publick 
utility” . The other is psychological. It takes the phenomena of property as arising from 
“imagination”. Because of this duality, Hu m e ’s chapter on property reads like a piece 
of music in counterpoint, with the theme introduced in the instrumental mode, and its 
development submerging in a psychological argument expanded and intensely 
elaborated in a sequence of footnotes.
3 See also Ku b o n -Gil k e  and Sc h l ic h t  (1993)
4 Somebody with a narrow mind may conclude that Hu m e  must have been inconsistent, somewhere. I 
prefer to leave that question open.
Regarding the origin of his ideas, see SMITH (1941), MOSSNER (1980), and FLEW (1986). As far as I 
can see, he gathered many suggestions from others (Hu t c h e s o n , Gr o t iu s , Ma n d e v il l e , 
Ne w t o n , De s c a r t e s , Ma l e b r a n c h e ), but his unique contribution was to develop a 
comprehensive view that integrated so many various strands of thought.
Stability 4
Hu m e  is quite explicit about pursuing two parallel lines of reasoning at once. He 
suspects that the psychological laws are of prime importance, but offers a free choice 
to the reader.
No questions about philosophy are more difficult, than when a number of 
causes present themselves for the same phenomenon, to determine which 
is the principal and predominant.... Thus, in the present case, there are, no 
doubt, motives of public interest for most of the rules, which determine 
property; but still I suspect, that these rules are principally fix’d by the 
imagination, or the more frivolous properties of our thought and 
conception. I shall continue to explain these causes, leaving it to the 
reader’s choice, whether he will prefer those derived from publick utility, 
or those deriv’d from the imagination.5 6
His actual presentation mixes, these two lines of argumentation freely. Nor is it 
unrealistic to do so. Empirically and naively, both aspects seem of relevance. The 
“clarity” view taken here suggests indeed that both “imagination” and instrumental 
considerations work closely together and rely on each other. As long as they work in 
the same direction, there would be no need to opt for one or the other alternative, if 
we disregard our own preference for simplicity and discounting for the moment. By 
choosing to acknowledge both lines of thought at once, we open a possibility of 
understanding strains and contradictions like the tension between instrumental and 
moral aspects of property mentioned above. We also open the possibility of 
understanding why instrumental and moral considerations emerge conjointly and 
often reinforce each other, while working at other times in opposite directions. 
Regarding our overall project, the counterpoint argument integrates phenomena of 
property into an overall view of custom.
Stability
The starting point for Hu m e  is instrumental. The first thing he considers is the 
stability o f possessions.^
I first consider men in their savage and solitary condition; and suppose, 
that being sensible of the misery of that state, and foreseeing the 
advantages that would result from society, they seek each other’s 
company, and make an offer of mutual protection and assistance. I also 
suppose, that they are endow’d with such sagacity as immediately to 
perceive, that the chief impediment to this project of society and 
partnership lies in the avidity and selfishness of their natural temper; to 
remedy which, they enter into a convention for the stability of possession, 
and for mutual restraint and forbearance.7
The hypothetical nature of this approach is defended as follows:
5 HUME (1740:504n).
6 The principles discussed in this and the subsequent sections go in part back to GROTIUS (1625), but 
Hu m e ’s  treatment is much more penetrating.
7 Hu m e  (1740:502-3)
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I am sensible that this method of proceeding is not altogether natural; but 
besides that I here only suppose those reflexions to be form’d at once, 
which in fact arise insensibly and by degrees; besides this, I say, ’tis very 
possible, that several persons, being by different accidents separated from 
the societies, to which they formerly belong’d, may be oblig’d to form a 
new society among themselves; in which case they are entirely in the 
situation above-mention’d.8
Thus, no sovereign is necessary to enforce the stability of possessions. Property will 
emerge gradually and naturally because it turns out to be advantageous. We may note 
here that “stability” is introduced to reduce conflict. It must refer to a rule, and to rule- 
obedience, and rule obedience must evolve somehow.
Symmetry
Yet, the principle of stability of possession is not enough. It is too general. Property 
rights must be specified more closely:
Tho’ the establishment of the rule, concerning the stability of possession, 
be not only useful, but even absolutely necessary to human society, it can 
never serve any purpose, while it remains in such general terms. Some 
method must be shewn, by which we may distinguish what particular 
goods are to be assign’d to each particular person, while the rest of 
mankind are excluded from their possession and enjoyment. Our next 
business, then, must be to discover the reasons which modify this general 
rule, and fit it to the common use and practice of the world.9
An obvious way would be to design a rule that maximizes utility at any instant, but 
this is not feasible:
’Tis obvious, that those reasons are not deriv’d from any utility or 
advantage, which either the particular person or the public may reap from 
his enjoyment of any particular goods, beyond what would result from the 
possession of them by any other person. ’Twere better, no doubt, that 
every one were possess’d of what is most suitable to him, and proper for 
his use: But besides, that this relation of fitness may be common to 
several at once, ’tis liable to so many controversies, and men are so partial 
and passionate in judging one of these controversies, that such a loose and 
uncertain rule wou’d be absolutely incompatible with peace of human 
society. The convention concerning the stability of possession is enter’d 
into, in order to cut off all occasions of discord and contention; and this 
end wou’d never be attain’d, were we allow’d to apply this rule differently 
in every particular case, according to every particular utility, which might 





An utilitarianism of this kind -  an act-utilitarianism -  is thus not feasible because it 
gives no clear guiding principle.11 In order to minimize conflict, the clarity principle 
must be taken into account. Thus the instrumental view is modified by introducing 
psychological considerations.
H u m e  does not dwell on this problem. Instead, he jumps directly to the conclusion 
that the rules must be general because, as a matter of fact, justice is general.
Justice, in her decisions, never regards the fitness or unfitness of objects 
to particular persons, but conducts herself by more extensive views. 
Whether a man be generous, or a miser, he is equally well receiv’d by her, 
and obtains with the same facility a decision in his favor, even for what is 
entirely useless to him.
It follows, therefore, that the general rule, that possessions must be stable, 
is not appy’d by particular judgements, but by other general rules, which 
must extend to the whole society, and must be inflexible either by spite or 
favor.12
This generality is introduced as something axiomatic, without further reasoning. In 
the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he simply states:
All the laws of nature, which regulate property, as well as all civil laws, 
are general, and regard alone some essential circumstances to the case, 
without taking into consideration the characters, situations, and 
connexions of the person concerned, or any particular consequences 
which may result from the determination of these laws in any particular 
case which offers. They deprive, without scruple, a beneficent man of all 
his possessions, if acquired by mistake, without a good title; in order to 
bestow them on a selfish miser, who has already heaped up immense 
stores of superfluous riches. Public utility requires that property should be 
regulated by general inflexible rules; and though such rules are adopted as 
best serve the same end of public utility, it is impossible to prevent all 
particular hardships, or make beneficial consequences result from every 
individual case. It is sufficient, if the whole plan or scheme be necessary 
to the support of civil society, and if the balance of good, in the main, do 
thereby preponderate much above that of evil. Even the general laws of 
the universe, though planned by infinite wisdom, cannot exclude all evil 
or inconvenience in every particular operation.13
This viewpoint has been taken up by modem “rule-utilitarianism” and “constitutional 
economics”.14 While act-utilitarianism would require us to maximize utility at any
11 See also HUME (1740: 532) where he speaks about the “confusion” that would otherwise arise.
12 Hu m e  (1740:502).
13 Hu m e  (1902:305-6)
14 See Ma c k ie  (1977:136-138) for a modem philosophical account. The book by BUCHANAN and 
BRENNAN (1985), entitled The Reason of Rules, develops the position taken in “constitutional 
economics”. It is characteristic that it does not contain any hint about features that might distinguish 
a rule from a non-rule. It seems, thus, that the argument must presuppose a psychology of rule 
formation. See also BUCHANAN (1994) for a recent restatement, and SGHLICHT (1994) for criticism.
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instant, rule-utilitariansm would require us to act at each instant according to the 
appropriate rule, and to select the rule that yields, on average, the highest utility 
among all conceivable rules.
The distinction between rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism can, however, be 
maintained only if the “best” rule requires us on certain occasions to act in a non-
maximizing manner. This would be incomprehensible from a strict utilitarian point of 
view, since we could design an amended rule that would be identical to the old one 
with the single exception of prescribing maximizing behavior in cases where the old 
rule did not.
As a consequence, rule-governed behavior implies either deliberate inefficiencies 
(that would destroy all utility-related arguments for the rule) or a rule preference.15 
Such a preference would apply not to random rules, and not to the amended rule with 
some inefficiencies ironed out, but to true psychological rules that are clear and 
intelligible.
The rule “Never tell a lie” is, in this sense, preferable to the rule “Never tell a lie if it 
can be detected, otherwise select the best alternative” Yet the second rule is certainly 
better with regard to individual outcomes, if the individually best alternative is 
chosen, or to collective outcomes, if the collectively best alternative is chosen. To 
settle for the clear rule can, I maintain, only be understood with reference to some 
underlying rule preference. It can not, in particular, be argued that the first rule 
(“never tell a lie”) is “ethically” more appealing than the modified version and ought 
to be preferred for that reason, because the second rule may read in this case: “Never 
tell a lie if it can be detected, otherwise select the socially best alternative”. From a 
purely instrumental point of view, this rule should still be morally preferable. It is not 
clear, and we do not find it convincing, and this must then be the reason why it is 
“ethically” unappealing.
A s we want to follow H u m e , we must thus stipulate rule preference. Rule-governed 
behavior must be preferred to other types of behavior purely because it is rule- 
governed, “For there is a principle in human nature, which we have frequently taken 
notice of, that men are mightily addicted to general rules, and that we often carry our 
maxims beyond those reasons, which first induc’d us to establish them.”16
The impartiality of the rules must be presupposed very much in the same vein as 
symmetry can be understood as an aspect of clarity. It is a purely formal feature that 
cannot be derived in any useful instrumentalist way.17 Utilitarian defenses presuppose 
symmetry in the problem setting in order to derive symmetry in the result.18 More 
philosophical approaches start with assumptions about “equal citizenship” or similar 
symmetry assumptions, rather than derive them from more fundamental sources.
It should also be noted that this formal symmetry does not say very much about equal 
treatment. Slaves will not be citizens, and equality in court is very different from 
equality of possessions. Symmetry applies to elements of a category. It is a very
15 Sc h l ic h t  (in preparation: Chap. 8).
16 Hu m e  (1740:551). All emphases -  here and elsewhere -  in the original.
17 SCHLICHT (in preparation: Sect. 6.8).
18 e.g. Se n  (1973)
Status Quo Preference
formal concept, related to clarity aspects of categorization. The entire argument comes 
down to saying that the stability of possessions requires the implementation of clear 
rules. As it happens, this is also the way in which custom works. From a planning 
perspective, we will be interested in finding that system of rules among the feasible 
rules that yields the highest “publick benefit”; from a positive perspective, we would 
inquire which rule-system among the feasible systems ultimately emerges.
Status Quo Preference
The rules that govern property must be specified more closely, however. Hu m e  argues 
that the initial rule will be to maintain the status quo. He argues as follows:
For when men ... have observ’d, that the principal disturbance in society 
arises from those goods, which we call external, and from their looseness 
and easy transition from one person to another; they must seek a remedy, 
by putting these goods, as far as possible, on the same footing with the 
fixe’d and constant advantages of mind and body.19
Thus the external things -  movable and immovable objects -  are assimilated to our 
personal features. We form in this way a concept of “property”. The term still 
contains this double meaning.
Once this is established, the rules that govern property must be specified further:
’Tis evident, then, that their first difficulty, in this situation, after the 
general convention for the establishment of society, and for the constancy 
of possession, is, how to separate their possessions, and assign to each his 
particular portion, which he must for the future inalterably enjoy. This 
difficulty will not detain them long; but it must immediately occur to 
them, as the most natural expedient, that every one continue to enjoy what 
he is at present master of, and that property or constant possession be 
conjoin’d to the immediate possession.20
Thus the status quo will be maintained. The reason for this relates to custom and the 
endowment effect:21
Such is the effect of custom, that it not only reconciles us to any thing we 
have long enjoy’d, but even gives us an affection for it, and makes us 
prefer it to other objects, which may be more valuable, but are less known 
to us. What has long lain under our eye, and has often been employ’d to 
our advantage, that we are always the most unwilling to part with; but can 
easily live without possessions, which we never have enjoy’d, and are not 
accustom’d to.
’Tis evident, therefore, that men wou’d easily acquiesce in this expedient, 
that every one continue to enjoy what he is at present possess'd of, and 
this is the reason, why they wou’d so naturally agree on preferring it.22
19 Hu m e  (1740:489)
20 Hu m e  (1740:503)
21 SCHLICHT (in preparation: Sect. 8.3)
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This argument confounds here instrumentalist and psychological arguments. It is 
because o f our psychological inclination to maintain the status quo that it is 
instrumentally expedient to maintain it. Hu m e  also offers a further argument that is 
couched entirely in terms of good continuity and clarity:
’Tis a quality, which I have already observ’d in human nature, that when 
two objects appear in close relation to each other, the mind is apt to 
ascribe to them any additional relation, in order to compleat the union; 
and this inclination is so strong, as often to make us run into errors.... And 
as property forms a relation betwixt a person and an object, ’tis natural to 
found it on some preceding relation; and as property is nothing but a 
constant possession, secur’d by the laws of society, ’tis natural to add it to 
the present possession, which is a relation that resembles it. For this also 
has its influence. If it be natural to conjoin all sorts of relations, ’tis more 
so, to conjoin such relations as are resembling, and are related together.2 3
There is, thus, at this level, no contradiction between the two lines of argumentation; 
rather, the instrumental view builds on the psychological, and both work together.
Occupation
Once the initial possessions have been determined, there is a need to cope with 
change:
But we may observe, that tho’ the rule of the assignment of property to the 
present possessor be natural, and by that means useful, yet its utility 
extends not beyond the first formation of society; nor wou’d any thing be 
more pernicious, than the constant observance of it; by which restitution 
wou’d be excluded and every injustice wou’d be authoriz’d and rewarded.
We must, therefore, seek for some other circumstance, that may give rise 
to property after society is once establish’d....
The possession of all eternal goods is changeable and uncertain; which is 
one of the most considerable impediments to the establishment of society, 
and is the reason why, by universal agreement, express or tacite, men 
restrain themselves by what we now call the rules of justice and equity.
The misery of the condition, which precedes this restraint, is the cause 
why they submit to that remedy as quickly as possible; and this affords us 
any reason, why we annex the idea of property to the first possession, or 
to occupation. Men are unwilling to leave property in suspence, even for 
the shortest time, or open the door to violence and disorder. To which we 
may add, that the first possession always engages the attention most; and 
did they neglect it, there wou’d be no color of reason for assigning 
property to any succeeding possession.24
22 HUME (1740:503-4), paragraph break added.
23 Hu m e  (1740:504-5n.)
24 Hu m e  (1740:505)
Occupation 10
Again we find an instrumentalist and a psychological argument employed conjointly. 
It would obviously be inefficient to leave resources idle. The first person to find 
something becomes its owner. This reduces possible inefficiencies from idleness. The 
psychological argument relates directly to psychological salience. We should note that 
the efficiency argument for the occupation rule is not entirely convincing. It may 
produce “search externalities” if two individuals each try to be the first at the object. 
Random allocation would be better in this case. Further, the first occupant may 
actually not use an object immediately, but still establish his claim, while another may 
have an immediate use. To give the right to the second person in these cases would be 
preferable from the point of view of reducing idleness of the resource. Without a 
clarity requirement we should expect, thus, quite different rules to emerge for 
different cases, but the clarity requirement restricts such tendencies. Yet they are not 
entirely eliminated from practical life. Custom would induce you to offer your seat to 
an old lady.
Occupation works, however, sometimes in a very subtle way:
And I farther observe, that a sensible relation, without any present power, 
is sometimes sufficient to give a title to any object. The sight of a thing is 
seldom a considerable relation, and is only regarded as such, when the 
object is hidden, or very obscure: in which case we find, that the view 
alone conveys a property, according to the maxim, that even a hole 
continent belongs to the nation, which first discover’d it. ’Tis however 
remarcable, that both in the case of discovery and that of possession, the 
first discoverer and possessor must join to the relation an intention of 
rendering himself proprietor, otherwise the relation will not have its 
effect; and that because the connexion in our fancy betwixt the property 
and the relation is not so great, but that it requires to be help’d by such an 
intention.25
We may state this by saying that it is the relatively clearest case that dominates, even 
in an unclear setting. The clearest connection between a person and an object is 
sharpened, and the other connections are discounted. However, it seems to me that the 
intention of the discoverer or possessor can assist our understanding only if it is 
expressed in a way which we can perceive -  in a clear way. Otherwise it will not help.
The problem of occupancy is in the end entirely related to “our fancy”, up to a point 
where issues become really difficult to handle.
Two Graecian colonies, leaving their native country, in search for new 
seats, were inform’d that a city near them was deserted by its inhabitants.
To know the truth of this report, they dispatch’d at once two messengers, 
one from each colony; who finding on their approach, that their 
information was true, began to race together with an intention to take 
possession of the city, each of them for his countrymen. One of these 
messengers, finding that he was not an equal match for the other, launch’d 
his spear at the gates of the city, and was so fortunate as to fix it there 
before the arrival of his companion. This produc’d a dispute betwixt the
25 Hu m e  (1740:507n.)
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two colonies, which of them was the proprietor of the empty city; and this 
dispute still subsists among philosophers.26
Hu m e  comments on this as follows:
I find the dispute impossible to be decided, and that because the whole 
question hangs upon the fancy, which is in this case not possess’d of any 
precise and determinate standard, upon which it can give sentence. To 
make this evident, let us consider, that if these two persons had been 
simply members of the colonies, and not messengers or deputies, their 
actions wou’d not have been of any consequence; since in that case their 
relation to the colonies wou’d have been feeble and imperfect. Add to 
this, that nothing determin’d them to run to the gates rather than the walls, 
or any other part of the city, but that the gates, being the most obvious and 
remarkable part, satisfy the fancy best in taking them for the whole.... 
Besides we may consider, that the touch or contact of one messenger is 
not properly possession, no more than the piercing the gates with a spear; 
but only forms a relation.... Which of these relations, then, conveys a right 
of property,.... I leave to the decision of such as are wiser than myself.27
Thus the rule of occupation rests on the strength of the “connection” between each 
colony and its messenger, and the strength of the connection between each messenger 
and the city. The problem would have been easier to solve if one of these chains, 
rather than both, were weakened. If one of the two persons had been a messenger of 
one colony, and the other simply a member of the other colony, but both behaved 
physically just as described before, Hu m e  would probably give the town to the 
messenger’s colony.28
Prescription
Another important rule described by Hu m e  is that long-standing possession creates 
property rights. This is the rule of “prescription”:
But it often happens, that the title of first possession becomes obscure 
thro’ time; and that ’tis impossible to determine many controversies, 
which may arise concerning it. In that case long possession or prescription 
naturally takes place, and gives a person a sufficient property in any thing 
he enjoys.... A man’s title, that is clear and certain at present, will seem 
obscure and doubtful fifty years hence, even tho’ the facts, on which it is 
founded, shou’d be prov’d with the greatest evidence and certainty. The 
same facts have not the same influence over so long an interval of time.
And this may be receiv’d as a convincing argument for our preceding 
doctrine with regard to property and justice. Possession over a long tract 
of time conveys a title to any object. But as ’tis certain, however every 
thing be produc’d in time, there is nothing real, that is produc’d by time: it
26 HUME(1740:507-8n.)
27 Hu m e  (1740:508n.)
28 This is in direct analogy to our earlier observation that entitlements rest entirely in the cognitive 
domain (SCHLICHT in preparation: Sect. 2.6).
Accession
follows, that property being produc’d by time, is not any thing real in the 
objects, but is the offspring of the sentiments, on which alone time is 
found to have any influence.29
Hu m e  explains the phenomenon that long and uninterrupted possession creates 
property rights that supersede previous rights as follows.
Present possession is plainly a relation betwixt a person and an object; but 
is not sufficient to counter-balance the relation of first possession, unless 
the former be long and uninterrupted: In which case the relation is 
encreas’d on the side of the present possession, by the distance. This 
change in the relation produces a consequent change in the property.30
Thus the prescription works very much like attribution processes in general.31 The 
most salient relation is selected and strengthened, and other relations are discounted.
Accession
The rule of accession describes how the property in one object implies property rights 
in other related objects. We know this as the right of usu fructus -  the right to the 
fruits of the property, but Hu m e  sees this in a much more fundamental way. The right 
of accession is established by any kind of “relation” between a person and an object 
that we hold in our “imagination”, and builds on the “strength of relations”, i.e. on 
clarity.
We acquire the property of objects by accession, when they are connected 
in an intimate manner with objects that are already our property, and at the 
same time are inferior to them. Thus the fruits of our garden, the offspring 
of our cattle, and the work of our slaves, are all of them esteem’d our 
property, even before possession. Where objects are connected together in 
the imagination, they are apt to be put on the same footing, and are 
commonly suppos’d to be endow’d with the same qualities. We readily 
pass from one to the other, and make no difference in our judgement 
concerning them; especially if the latter be inferior to the former.32
The rule of accession is entirely based on psychological propensities of man. “This 
source of property can never be explain’d but from the imaginations; and one may 
affirm, that the causes here are unmix’d.”33 Hu m e  sees, thus, no instrumental reasons 
here, but this does not exclude them. Yet some peculiarities that we find are quite 
easily related to psychological regularities:
... the ascribing o f property to accession is nothing but an effect o f the 
relations o f ideas, and o f the smooth transition o f the imagination. ... The 
empire of Great Britain seems to draw along with it the dominion of the 
Orkneys, the Hebrides, the Isle o f Man, and the Isle o f Wight; but the
29 HUME (1740:508-9)
30 Hu m e  (1740:509n.)




authority over these lesser islands does not naturally imply any title to 
Great Britain. In short, a small object naturally follows a great one as its 
accession; but a great one is never suppos’d to belong to the proprietor of 
a small one related to it, merely on account of that property and relation....
When we attribute to a person a property in two objects, we do not always 
pass from the person to one object, and from that to the other related to it.
The objects being here to be consider’d as the property of the person, we 
are apt to join them together, and place them in the same light. Suppose 
therefore, a great object and a small object to be related together; if a 
person be strongly related to the great object, he will likewise be strongly 
related to both the objects, consider’d together, because he is related to the 
most considerable part. On the contrary, if he be only related to the small 
object, he will not be strongly related to both, consider’d together, since 
his relation lies only with the most trivial part, which is not apt to strike us 
in any degree, when we consider the whole. And this is the reason, why 
small objects become accessions to great ones, and not great to small.34
The additional examples that Hu m e  supplies relate to property in rivers and bays. 
Recent history provides, however, many further examples, related to the ownership of 
islands or uninhabited regions, like Antarctica or the North Sea. A conspicuous 
example of a conflict between the rules of occupation and accession is the ongoing 
dispute between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. This group of 
islands belongs to Great Britain by occupation, but accession would entitle the 
Argentine to the ownership, since the Falklands are closer to Argentina than to any 
other country, and are also much smaller than Argentina. Thus there were conflicting 
rights emerging from Hu m e ’s principles. As it happens, a war was fought over this 
issue.
Succession
Succession relates to the way in which property rights are allocated if the owner dies 
or disappears. Hu m e  is very brief on that:
The right of succession is a very natural one, from the presum’d consent 
of the parent or near relation, and from the general interest of mankind, 
which requires, that men’s possessions shou’d pass to those, who are 
dearest to them, in order to render them more industrious and frugal. 
Perhaps these causes are seconded by the influence of relation, or the 
association of ideas, by which we are naturally directed to consider the 
son after the parent’s decease, and ascribe him a title to his father’s 
possessions. Those goods must become property of some body: But o f 
whom is the question. Here ’tis evident the persons children naturally 
present themselves to the mind; and being already connected to those
34 HUME(1740:510-In.)
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possessions by means of their decease’d parent, we are apt to connect 
them still farther by the relation of property.35
The Workings of “Imaginations”
All these arguments relate mostly to the workings o f “imagination”. The 
instrumentalist theme is largely dropped. We may of course embellish Hu m e ’s 
counterpoint by adding various instrumental reasons that reconfirm the principles of 
occupation, prescription, accession, and succession, but we shall refrain from doing 
so. Whatever reasons we select, however, they cannot involve case-by case 
optimization. They must be rule-bound, and this constrains the possibilities. This 
insight suffices for the moment. We shall, however, come back to the instrumental 
theme on a broad scale when we consider the theory of property rights below.
Let us first try to summarize Hu m e ’s arguments about the workings of “imagination” 
in a slightly more general fashion. Hu m e  provides again the starting-point.
It has been observ’d above, that the mind has a natural propensity to join 
relations, especially resembling ones, and finds a kind of fitness and 
uniformity in such a union. From this propensity are deriv’d these laws of 
nature, that upon the first formation o f society, property always follows 
the present possession; and afterwards, that it arises from first or from  
long possession. Now we may easily observe, that relation is not confin’d 
merely to one degree; but that from an object which is related to us, we 
acquire a relation to every other object which is related to it, and so on, till 
the thought loses the chain by too long a progress. However the relation 
may weaken by each remove, ’tis not immediately destroy’d; but 
frequently connects two objects by means of an intermediate one, which is 
related to both. And this principle is of such force as to give rise to the 
right of accession, and causes us to acquire the property not only o f such 
objects as we are immediately possess’d of, but also of such as are closely 
connected to them.
Suppose a German, a Frenchman, and a Spaniard to come into a room, 
where there are place’d upon the table three bottles o f wine, Rhenish, 
Burgundy, and Port-, and suppose they shou’d fall a quarreling about the 
division of them; a person, who was chosen for umpire, wou’d naturally, 
to show his impartiality, give every one the product of his own country:
And this from a principle, which, in some measure, is the source o f those 
laws of nature, that ascribe property to occupation, prescription and 
accession.
In all these cases, and particularly that of accession, there is first a natural 
unity betwixt the idea of the person and that of the object, and afterwards 
a new and moral union produc’d by that right or property, which we 
ascribe to the person.36
35 Hu m e  (1740:510-513). This passage consists of 14 lines scattered over four pages. The rest of those 
pages is devoted to 182 lines of footnotes in small print explaining the workings of imagination.
36 HUME (1740:509-1 On.)
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In the terminology adopted previously, we could say that property emerges from rule 
perception and from our desire to establish regularity. Once these rules are 
established, they shape morality:
... the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally, 
and of itself; tho’ ’tis certain, that it is also augmented by a new artifice, 
and that the public instructions of politicians, and the private education of 
parents, contribute to the giving us a sense of honour and duty in the strict 
regulation of our actions with regard to the properties of others.37
Morality in turn affects behavior:
If morality had naturally no influence on human passions and actions,
’twere in vain to take such pains to inculcate it.38
The “sense o f morality” that establishes this connection, is “natural”.39
Thus, the argument i s , , straightforward. It goes from pattern perception to action. The 
link is obtained by postulating a moral sense that engenders a preference to follow 
those rules. Thus, Hu m e ’s theory of property may be understood as a special instance 
o f customary rule formation, as viewed in this book.
Universality
The theory of property as expounded by Hu m e , is intended to be universalist. Even if 
his idea of justice is “artificial” in a philosophical sense, he maintains that it is 
“natural” in the sense of being “inseparable from the species”.40 The same 
universalistic stance is taken in the view of custom developed in this book. Yet an 
obvious reaction to such universalistic positions is that it inappropriately generalizes 
the European experience of a few centuries to entire mankind, back to the 
Neanderthals, forth to an indefinite future, and comprising all cultures around the 
globe. This is deemed too strong a position to take. Thus, it may, be appropriate to 
discuss what the universalistic position entails, tailored to the issue of property.
First, universalism is not entirely absurd. The statement that humans have two arms 
and two legs may go undisputed. But what about rule perception, clarity, and so on? I 
have argued that the basic principles are culture-invariant, but that clarification 
processes will generate framing effects of various kinds. This will allow for infinitely 
many cultures.41 Now, Hu m e ’s rules of property are nearly universal, but there are 
exceptions. This renders it less useful to survey the anthropological literature on that 
topic.42 It is more interesting to discuss some exceptions, since these tend to 
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Regarding occupancy, H u m e  has argued that “men are unwilling to leave property in 
suspence, even for the shortest time, or open the door to violence and disorder.”43 
There are however, hunters and gatherers who do not know private property in land. 
This seems at first sight to contradict H u m e ’s  principle of occupancy. Yet the 
principle applies whenever there is a threat of violence and disorder. Such a threat 
would only arise from scarcity. H u m e ’s  principle must certainly be modified, but the 
thrust of the argument remains unaffected.
Regarding succession, H u m e  has postulated that property will pass on from parents to 
their children because “the persons children naturally present themselves to the mind; 
and being already connected to those possessions by means of their deceas’d parent, 
we are apt to connect them still farther by the relation of property.”44 Yet in many 
cultures, possessions are distributed among the clan according to customary rules. 
Here again H u m e  is wrong. Still his argument can be maintained, as those societies 
are characterized by loose ties between parents and offspring.45 Further, there are 
cases where private belongings are destroyed, burnt or buried with the corpse. These 
practices can hardly be defended on the assumption that “the goods must become 
property of some body.” 46 Yet the clarity view would suggest that a ritual like the 
burning of the personal belongings may help to re-establish clarity in the social 
pattern by destroying elements that may create ambiguity.
Thus it is easy to refute some of H u m e ’s  principles about property, although others -  
in particular on the stability of property, symmetry, prescription, and occupancy -  may 
prove more reliable. It is, however, less easy to refute the underlying clarity view. 
This view entails the perception of patterns that induce actions to complete these 
patterns or improve them. As I am not in a position to prove the universality o f that 
view, I can only hint at the psychological evidence that supports it. Another support 
can be obtained by looking at animal behavior. The suggestion is that traits that are 
shared by Englishmen, chimpanzees, lizards, and cicadas, may be fairly universal.
Property in Ethological Perspective
The first man who fenced off a plot of land and said “this is mine” was, according to 
Ro u s s e a u , the true founder of civil society.47 This insight is a gem in the glorious 
tradition of hypothetical theorizing. It sounds as if ROUSSEAU had never encountered a 
dog. Possessive behavior is widespread among animals and not unique to humans, 
and we may accordingly learn something about the foundations of possessive 
behavior by considering some ethological studies.
The most important form of possessive behavior amongst animals is territoriality. The 
usual explanation given for the phenomena of territoriality is that they have evolved 
because of beneficial effects on the survival of the individual and the species. If every 
individual defends a certain territory of its habitat against members of the same 
species, this secures the necessary food supply for the individual and spreads the
43 Hu m e  (1740:505)
44 HUME (1740:510-513)
45 Ku b o n -Gil k e  (forthcoming:)
46 Hu m e  (1740:512)
47 Ro u s s e a u  (1754:76)
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species across space in such a way as to use it most efficiently. Friendliness would be 
unwarranted. It would be nice if you were prepared to share your territory with a 
newcomer, but it would be disastrous. The food supply would not suffice to support 
two couples and their offspring, and all would die. In this way, benevolent individuals 
will be weeded out by evolution, and only the nasties survive. This explains 
territoriality.
There are of course many animals that do not form territories. Some fish form schools 
but seem to have no definite home-turf that they defend. Other animals must travel 
from pasture to pasture. This does not contradict the argument about territoriality 
outlined above. We should expect territoriality to occur only whenever it is 
conductive to survival. We should also note that our close relatives, the chimpanzees 
and the baboons, are territorial.
Let us look, however, a little closer at the phenomenon of territoriality before we 
relate it to phenomena of property in human societies.48
The first observation is that the establishment of a territory may involve some 
fighting, but once the territory has been established, fighting will be rare. We should 
expect this from an evolutionary perspective. There would be no great use for the 
individual in having a territory that is to be defended by uninterrupted fighting, and it 
would be a disadvantage for the species to spoil resources in this manner. Boundaries 
must be accepted. There may be possibilities of revision, and processes to revise 
them, but boundaries lose all their meaning if they are under permanent dispute. 
Territoriality requires that boundaries be respected. The nasties should not be too 
nasty.
Thus, borders must have a direct behavioral impact, in much the same way, as 
customs must carry entitlements. This is the case. There is a strong “owner effect” to 
be observed in territorial animals, which is very closely related to the endowment 
effect.49 If you put two male desert clickers on a territory owned by one of them, the 
owner will invariably win the fight.50
Territories must be recognized and recognizable. Natural landmarks often serve as 
territory boundaries. Domestic mice prefer large nearby objects as visual clues.51 
Territorial songs or scentmarks may mark territories. Ethologists define territories in 
terms of intolerance against intruders.52
Yet boundaries are not always respected. An animal may seek to take possession of a 
high-quality territory by invading it and attacking the incumbent owner. This is 
usually not successful, because owners of high-quality territories are usually in better 
physical shape than intruders or owners of low-quality territories. This is, however, 
not the determining cause, at least among desert clickers: “The occupation of high-
48 An introduction to the topic is provided by ElBL-ElBESFELD (1975:340-371)
49 Sc h l ic h t  (in preparation: Sect. 8.3)
50 W a n g  and G r e e n f ie l d  (1991). This regularity has been observed in many other animals, too, see 
e.g. Da v ie s  (1978), Rie c h e r t (1978), Fr a n k e  St e v e n s  (1988), Se n a r  et al. (1989), En g l u n d  
and Ot t o  (1991), ElBL-ElBESFELD (1975:348, Fig. 15-41)
51 Ma c in t o s h  (1973)
52 EflBL-ElBESFELD (1975:344-45)
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quality territories is primarily determined by early eclosion rather than by aggressive 
contests. Why late-eclosed males respect ownership by early-eclosed males is still an 
enigma.”53 It appears as if the desert clickers have read H u m e :
The possession of all eternal goods is changeable and uncertain; which is 
one of the most considerable impediments to the establishment of society, 
and is the reason why, by universal agreement, express or tacite, clickers 
restrain themselves by what we now call the rules of justice and equity.
The misery of the condition, which precedes this restraint, is the cause 
why they submit to that remedy as quickly as possible; and this affords 
them any reason, why they annex the idea of property to the first 
possession, or to occupation.54
Further, there is the possibility of enlarging one’s own territory at the neighbor’s 
expense. The assumption usually made is that a border dispute will be settled by a 
fight, and the winner will obtain ownership of the contested territory. Many biologists 
seem to have assumed that in an axiomatic way. Nature is, however, somewhat more 
complex, at least with regard to lizards.
As a lizard, you may use two strategies to enlarge your territory at your neighbor’s 
expense.55 One strategy is to invade the neighbor’s territory and to chase him away if 
he objects. After a while, the territory will be yours. This works, however, only if  you 
are stronger than your neighbor. If you are not, you can nevertheless succeed by sheer 
persistence. You may lose every fight, or may even find it advantageous to flee right 
away, but you return again and again. If you are persistent enough, you will become 
the owner. The regularity exploited here has also been described by H u m e .
But it often happens, that the title of first possession becomes obscure 
thro’ time; and that ’tis impossible to determine many controversies, 
which may arise concerning it. In that case long possession or prescription 
naturally takes place, and gives a lizard a sufficient property in any thing it
enjoys.56
You may find also rather refined systems of property rights in the animal kingdom: 
Many male cats can use the same area, but at different, well-established times, and 
each is only a temporal owner of the territory -  and retreats from it at other times.57 It 
is also interesting that territorial species do not defend all areas they may visit against 
members of their own kind. Some areas are neutral and serve as commons.58
If we turn to property in movable objects, we find also quite astonishing features in 
the possessive behavior of animals. Again, ownership must be recognizable and 
recognized. The ownership cues are quite different among different species. Proximity
53 W a n g  and Gr e e n f ie u j (1991:586)
54 Adapted from Hu m e  (1740:505), with “men” replaced by “clickers”.
55 The following draws on STAMPS and KRISHNAN (1995). The authors remark that field studies about 
territory formation are rare and that many existing studies assume that the winner of a fight has 
obtained the contested territory, instead of testing that independently.
56 Adapted from HUME (1740:507-8), with “person” replaced by “lizard”.
57 EIBL-EIBESFELD (1975:344)
58 E ib l -Eib e s f e l d  (1975:342)
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of the object to its owner, as well as the possibility to take it away and move it around, 
are ownership cues with the macaques, for instance, that inhibit non-owners.59 In 
baboons, the mere memory of proximity of the owner inhibits non-owners.60
These observations stress three interrelated features of property in a very general way. 
First, property must be recognizable. Second, property must have a behavioral impact, 
witnessed by the owner effect. Third, property can emerge without any formal legal 
system.
In this way, property is tied up with the owner effect. This seems to be the core 
phenomenon. Individuals can develop special affinities with objects in their 
surroundings. These are just the “connexions in imagination” that H u m e  stressed so 
much. This is the basis for property. On that basis, property can take many forms. 
This may be compared to the faculty of having a language, that must precede any 
language, and language may take many forms.
Ethology thus establishes that animals can form special psychological ties to 
territories, or to things. Such property is not necessarily a social phenomenon. An 
animal will form its territory even if no competitors are to be feared, and Robinson 
may form a special tie with his walking stick, in spite of being able to find many 
pieces of wood that would serve the purpose just as well.61 Property without society 
would be an entirely private affair, driven by rule preference like habit. We need not 
establish that humans must form certain specific ties to specific objects, although 
some ethologists would argue in that direction. The mere unspecified possibility of 
forming them is sufficient for our purposes. The laws that underlie the formation of 
these ties constitute, then, the ultimate source of property. They are assumed to be 
universal. The clarity view is even more daring in trying to understand them as 
brought about by overarching clarification processes.
The Voluntary Transfer of Property
Property is, thus, not a uniquely human phenomenon. Man has, however, the 
possibility of transferring property rights voluntarily.62 This is unique to humans, 
although rudiments of ownership transfers may be found with apes.63 Paraphrasing 
Adam S m i t h , we need not decide whether “this propensity is one of those original 
principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given; or whether, as
59 R u m m e r  and Co r d s  (1991 -.545-547)
60 SlGG and Fa l e t t  (1985)
61 This aspect is usually neglected, e.g. by HUME (1740:501) and DEMSETZ (1967:104).
62 Ry a n  (1987:1029) wrongly translates the Roman ius utendi et abutendi as comprising the right to 
use and the power to dispose and takes this as defining property. This is not my usage. I consider 
property as a particular bundle of rights, shaped by the same regularities as other rights. This 
comprises various cases of attenuated property rights. Often you cannot trade with gifts, or you are 
not allowed to misuse property or leave it idle. On the Trobriand islands, property is related by 
lineage to mythical ancestors. As you cannot exchange your ancestors, you cannot exchange your 
property (Be l l -Kr a n n h a l s  1990:104). Even the Roman “right to use and to misuse” is too 
restrictive.
63 E l l is  (1985:126)
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seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and 
speech.”64
Sm it h  referred, however, to the human “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one 
thing for another.”65 Here I do not follow. This statement mixes too many aspects and 
creates more confusion than necessary. The problems that I see in Sm it h ’s wording 
are the following. Firstly, it would be better to talk about a “propensity to exchange ... 
common to all men” and drop “truck” and “barter”. Truck and barter derive from 
exchange, yet are not necessary aspects of exchange. We find “take it or leave it 
offers” in modem societies as well as in exchanges between alien tribes that share no 
common language (“silent trade”).66 The “truck and barter” aspect is also 
unconvincing in other ways. Although it is true that “nobody ever saw a dog make a 
fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog”, it is unclear 
why “truck and barter” should relate to fairness, apart from Ca n n a n ’s observation 
that it is by no means clear what the reason could be for exchanging one bone for 
another.67 Secondly, transfer of property takes place in various ways, and exchange is 
just a special case, that arises when one transfer is conditioned on the other. We may 
say that property may give rise to quid-pro-quo exchange, but only under certain 
conditions. There are societies, organized around principles of reciprocity, that rely on 
obligatory gift-giving without immediate equivalent returns. An equivalence is only 
achieved in the longer run, in a statistical sense.68 (Markets are, thus, not more 
“natural”, but also not less “natural” than other forms of social coordination, in 
contrast to what Sm it h ’s statement suggests.) Modem societies maintain rudiments, 
like the right to hospitality. Systems of public provision fall in this category, too.
So let me follow Hu m e  and consider the rule of “transference of property by consent.”
However useful, or even necessary, the stability of possession may be to 
human society, ’tis attended with very considerable inconveniences. The 
relation of fitness or suitableness ought never to enter into consideration, 
in distributing the properties of mankind; but we must govern ourselves 
by rules, which are more general in their application, and more free from 
doubt and uncertainty. Of this kind, present possession upon the first 
establishment of society; and afterwards occupation, prescription, 
accession, and succession. As these depend very much on chance, they 
must frequently prove contradictory both to men’s wants and desires; and 
persons and possessions must often be very ill adjusted. This is a grand 
inconvenience, which calls for a remedy. To apply one directly, and allow 
every man to seize by violence what he judges to be fit for him, wou’d 
destroy society; and therefore the rules of justice seek medium betwixt a 
rigid stability, and this changeable and uncertain adjustment. But there is 
no medium better than the obvious one, that possession and property
64 Sm it h  (1776:13).
65 Sm it h  (1776:13).
66 BASUetal. (1987)
67 Sm it h  (1776:13).
68 Ma u s s  (1924). Lé v i-St r a u s s  (1949:122) aptly terms this “generalized exchange”.
The Theory of Property Rights
shou’d always be stable, except when the proprietor consents to bestow 
them on some other person.69 70
This sounds convincing, yet the right to transfer is far from universal, and even if such 
rights exist, they occasionally appear quite different from the right described by 
H u m e . Yet the “exceptions” tend again to reconfirm, rather than invalidate, H u m e ’s  
general view.
The Theory of Property Rights
An example is given by the system of property rights found among the Zunis, an 
Indian tribe in New Mexico. Consider two Zunis, named “A” and “B”. An 
anthropologist reports about their property rights in land as follows.
A has let his field go out of cultivation. If B wishes to plant in it, A cannot 
refuse. Although it still belongs to A, it would be “mean” -  and 
unavailing -  to assert his claim so long as B is using it. It is perfectly clear 
to any Zuni that B needs the field more than A. Isn’t he using it? If A 
presses his claim, and he has the legal right to do, B offers another field in 
exchange. If he has no other field he can spare, this proves that he needs 
this one. So A compromises by offering a field in exchange. B now has 
clear title to the second field.10
This seems far away from any right of transfer as described by H u m e . Yet the 
efficiency argument put forward by H u m e  may well apply here. The right to use 
uncultivated fields can certainly be defended on efficiency grounds. The same would 
hold true for the right to maintain the crop, otherwise those who invest in cultivation 
could be exploited, and investment in cultivation would be suboptimal. In so far as the 
plants cannot be separated from the soil, the Zuni system seems perfectly in accord 
with H u m e ’s  line of argument, although not with his result. But the Zuni case violates 
one of the assumptions made by H u m e , namely that property rights should disregard 
personal needs because this would lead to “confusion”. Yet in the Zuni case, utility is 
objectified by cultivation, and so it is possible to attach general rules to cultivation. 
The cause is not there, and so the result does not obtain. The Zuni case thus 
reconfirms, rather than invalidates, H u m e ’s  general approach while conflicting with 
his conclusions.
The modem theory of property rights has centered around this type of 
argumentation.71 The theory of the firm, to be discussed in the next chapter, draws 
extensively on such ideas. For the present purpose it is, however, useful to discuss 
still another ownership phenomenon that seems to contradict H u m e ’s  conclusions but 
reconfirms his principles.
Consider communal property. This is a widespread phenomenon, but seems not be 
covered by Hume’s treatment.72 A prominent example is the “commons” in medieval
69 HUME (1740:514)
70 BUNZEL (1938:347)
71 The classical statement is De m s e t z  (1967). Important contributions include Al c h ia n  and De m s e t z  
(1972) and Al c h ia n  (1984;1987).
72 HUME (1740:538) mentions joint property, however.
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England. This was communally owned pasture. The institution of commons was 
widespread. It was maintained for more than 1000 years, and parts survive to the 
present.73 At first glance, this institution seems to carry all the known inefficiencies of 
public property with it. In particular, one would expect overgrazing. This was, 
however, reduced by communal regulations that restricted usage to members of the 
community and allotted quotas of animals to them. So the “overgrazing” inefficiency 
was checked by regulation.
Communal property in grazing land had, however, considerable advantages.74 The 
grazing habit of cattle is such that they stray while eating. On a small pasture, you 
cannot easily restrict the animal to just a small part of that small field. A large herd 
can, however, be kept together on a large field, and it can be kept away from parts of 
the pasture. This allows the grass to recuperate until the animals are allowed back for 
grazing. As a result, a large herd will make better usage of a large field, than a small 
herd could on a correspondingly small field. Further, the supervision of a herd of 
cattle, or a flock of sheep involves economies of scale. A communal shepherd with 
his dogs can easily supervise a large flock. Further, the costs o f fencing off individual 
plots can be saved.
Other advantages relate to more intricate features. Commons formed part of the “open 
field system”, that involved an elaborate mode of scattered strip farming, with fallows 
used for grazing, and the animals fertilizing the fallows. Various complementarities 
between livestock and crop complicate the picture. We need not discuss this in detail. 
The overall argument is simply that a system of communal property rights may have 
efficiency advantages. In these cases, we would expect communal property to emerge.
A hypothetical story would be as follows: Starting from private property, people 
would transfer their rights to the community in exchange for grazing rights. They 
would be willing to set up such a system because everybody would benefit from it. 
Now, this is hypothetical. The origin of communal pastures is rather obscure. It is 
likely that the system emerged historically from Germanic systems o f communal 
property, and it certainly evolved “insensibly and by degrees”.75 It comes in many 
variants and shadings. We may imagine a process of continuous trial and error, 
incessantly re-arranging property rights, until some stable pattern emerged. 
Subsequent variations were reversed because they turned out to be a disadvantage, 
and this stabilized the system.
We may tell another hypothetical story, starting with communal property, but with 
advantages occurring from switching to private property. In this case, there would be 
a continuous pressure to privatize. The members of the community would agree 
gradually to allot more rights to the individuals, because this would benefit all of 
them. Processes of this type actually do occur. A modest example for the
73 The following draws on Da h l m a n  (1980). See also HOFFMANN (1975) and McCLOSKEY (1975).
74 I follow Da h l m a n  (1980:112-13) to illustrate the property-rights argument. It is, thus, not 
maintained that the account given by DAHLMAN is factually correct. It seems to have the weakness 
of neglecting political forces that may maintain economically inefficient states. Yet it serves to 
nicely illustrate the way in which property rights theory proceeds. See HOFFMANN (1975) for a 
detailed historical account and references to the historical literature.
75 see Ho f f m a n n  (1975).
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transformation of communal property seems to be currently under way with the 
Hutterites, an anabaptist group in North America.76 The more dramatic developments 
of this kind -  the dissolution of communal property in England, or the collapse of the 
communist countries -  can, however, not be easily understood in this simple way, as 
they involve explicit political power, rather than tacit and gradual social change, and I 
do not want to deal with this issue here.77 It should be noted, however, that H u m e ’s  
approach seems to me to offer a fruitful way of thinking about political power. HUME 
analyzed the origins of government and the nature of “allegiance” as the source of 
political power in a most penetrating way.78
Some Problems With Property Rights
Once property rights are transferable, there will emerge, thus, a private incentive to re-
arrange them in such a way as to exhaust possible advantages. The modem 
contractual view takes this perspective. It sees institutions as being brought about by 
such a process of reshuffling property rights. Firms emerge in this manner, as do 
families, churches, states, and markets. The overarching view is that the various 
organizational forms emerge, so to speak, from institutional competition. Better 
institutional solutions outcompete inferior ones.79
Yet this approach has some difficulties. The first is the efficiency problem. The 
approach cannot easily explain inefficiencies, in the sense of a waste of resources 
from the point of view of the members of a whole group or society. There would be 
no reason to expect that such arrangement could be perpetuated. There would be an 
incentive to change them. The benefits would outweight the costs, and the losers 
could be fully compensated from the gains, leaving some surplus to be distributed. 
This would imply optimization instant by instant, rather than optimization by 
selecting appropriate rules. In other words, the approach does not take into account all
76 Pe t e r  and W it h a k e r  (1981)
77 The dissolution of communal property in pasture is part of the “enclosures” which have been 
discussed in the literature. It is beyond my scope to settle the controversial issues involved, but let 
me briefly indicate the problem. Da h l m a n  (1980:188-199) interprets the political processes that 
actually re-defined property rights as actuated by changes in relative prices, as induced by changes 
in technology and demand. In other words, the system was changed by a response to purely 
economic incentives. This rendered enclosures profitable.
Some would argue that a political power structure can prevail in spite of emerging inefficiencies, as 
long as it can be maintained by the interests of those with power, and that the systems of communal 
property can be viewed as having been retained in this manner. In certain instances, the dissolution 
of communal property was much more complex than a straightforward property rights approach 
would suggests. Property rights were not divisible, alienable, or transferable, to begin with. Changes 
could be fostered by the lords if they were interested in promoting such changes, or they could be 
impeded by them if they saw dangers in the alternatives. The spread of markets and of long-distance 
trade induced them sometimes to act in ways that fostered, as unintended consequences, the further 
spreading of markets and the dissolution of the traditional political structure. The lords were 
prompted, for instance, to replace the personal services they were entitled to receive from their 
followers by cash rents. This process induced the dissolution of feudal bonds and the further spread 
of market transactions and privatization. This is the “bauble thesis” advanced by JONES (1981:85- 
87), following Sm it h  (1776:385-394). It goes far beyond the boundaries of any straightforward 
property rights approach.
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79 Al c h l a n  (1984), W il l ia m s o n  (1985)
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the psychological forces that constrain possible rules, and therefore possible 
institutions.
Property rights theorists start from the assumption of the survival of the most efficient 
practices. The argument should carry over to all types of social arrangements, 
institutions, and techniques. This stands in contrast with the many pronounced 
inefficiencies that we observe in other cultures, as well as in our own. From a 
property rights perspective, we may hope to understand these apparent inefficiencies 
as ultimately serving some enigmatic purpose, but this seems largely a matter of 
unfounded faith, and it seems to be better to understand the reasons for inefficiencies, 
rather than to assume them away. Consider, as an illustration, the following account 
about the persistence of an inefficient tool:
A good example for the persistence of an unimpressive design is the 
Oldowan hand axe .... It consists of a waterwom pebble about the size of a 
fist, from one end of which a few chips were knocked off to produce a 
rough edge that could be used for hacking, mashing, scraping, grubbing 
for roots, and breaking bones to extract the marrow. This tool remained in 
use for at least two million years until the development of the Acheulian 
hand axe, made of flint, which gave a sharper edge.
To argue that the Oldowan hand axe persisted for so long because it was 
marvellously adapted is clearly absurd: as a piece of technology it was 
crude in the extreme, and very far from the most efficient use that could 
have been made of stone even at that time, as subsequent developments in 
the later Palaeolithic and the Neolithic showed very clearly.80
Such “survivals of the mediocre” over millennia poses, as a matter of principle, severe 
problems to all theoretical approaches that put exclusive stress on instrumental 
considerations.81 The theory of property rights is one of them.
The second problem relates to the unspecified set o f alternatives. Due to this 
difficulty, the property rights approach does not explain very much. It can make 
understandable why one institution is selected from a given set of feasible 
alternatives, but it does not say anything about the set of feasible alternatives. This 
renders it arbitrary. By inventing some alternatives, we may change the result of the 
analysis. This has not gone unnoticed. D a h l m a n , in his discussion of the open field 
system, is quite explicit about it.
The argum ent.... will emphatically not be that the open field system was 
‘the best of all possible worlds’. Since the set of ‘all possible worlds’ is 
impossible to define in any relevant m anner.... we can only make use of a 
more limited notion of efficiency. The argument presented here will, 
therefore, only be that the open field system with its specific property 
rights mixture was efficient relative to the modem system of farming with
80 Ha l l pik e  (1986:114). The book contains many other references of this kind.
81 I thank Eric JONES for stressing this and providing the reference.
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one man, one owner, one decisionmaker; that is, relative to enclosed 
farms.82
Analogues to the putting-out system, or the factory system, are not discussed, for 
instance, and it is certainly not possible to discuss all feasible alternatives. A property- 
rights explanation of an institution thus boils down to two assertions: That the 
institution can maintain itself, and that it is better than some other institutions that are 
also considered.
The third difficulty relates to the relevance o f property rights. It is not clear why the 
specific nature of property rights should matter at all. It may be sufficient that 
property rights are well-specified.83 Consider again the institution of the commons 
and compare it to a system of private property rights in tracts of the pasture. If 
communal use were better, with private ownership prevailing, the owners of the 
patches could join and decide to employ a shepherd and use the pasture together. 
Thus, there would be, no need to introduce communal property. Conversely, in the 
case of inefficiencies arising with communal property, land pieces could be rented out 
to individual farmers, and a kind of market socialism would emerge. Quite generally 
and abstractly, all regulations that can be made in the one system could be introduced 
in the other. Again, there is some vagueness here.
Rituals
Yet, despite these theoretical difficulties, the right to transfer property by consent has 
great advantages. It enables man to capture the benefits arising from comparative 
advantage and the division of labor. So let us return to H u m e :
This rule can have no ill consequence, in occasioning war and dissentions; 
since the proprietor’s consent, who alone is concern’d, is taken along in 
the alienation: And it may serve to many good purposes in adjusting 
property to persons. Different parts of the earth produce different 
commodities; and not only so, but different men both are by nature fitted 
for different employments, and attain greater perfection in any one, when 
they confine themselves to it alone. All this requires mutual exchange and 
commerce; for which reason the translation of property by consent is 
founded on a law of nature, as well as its stability without such consent.84
In spite of all these benefits, the moral aspect causes trouble:
The property of an object, when taken for something real, without any 
reference to morality, or the sentiments of the mind, is a quality perfectly 
insensible, and even inconceivable; nor can we form any distinct notion, 
either of its stability or translation. This imperfection of our ideas is less 
sensibly felt with regard to its stability, as it engages less our attention, 
and is easily past over by the mind, without any scrupulous examination.
But as translation of property from one person to another is a more 
remarkable event, the defect of our ideas becomes more sensible on that
82 Da h l m AN (1980:99).
83 The following is a variation on COASE’s (1960) ideas.
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occasion, and obliges us to turn ourselves on every side in search of some 
remedy.85
This search for remedies give rise to various rituals, and lawyers and moralists help us 
to augment the inventory:
Now as nothing more enlivens any idea than a present impression, and a 
relation betwixt that impression and the idea; ’tis natural for us to seek 
some false light from this quarter. In order to aid the imagination in 
conceiving the transference of property, we take the sensible object, and 
actually transfer its possession to the person, on whom we wou’d bestow 
the property. The suppos’d resemblance of the actions, and the presence 
of this sensible delivery, deceive our mind, and make it fancy, that it 
conceives the mysterious transition of property. And that this explication 
of the matter is just, appears hence, that men have invented symbolical 
delivery, to satisfy the fancy, where the real one is impracticable. Thus the 
giving of the keys of the granary is understood to be the delivery of the 
com contain’d in it: The giving of stone and earth represents the delivery 
of the manor. This is a kind of superstitious practice in civil laws, and in 
the laws of nature, resembling the Roman catholic superstitions in 
religion. As the Roman catholics represent the inconceivable mysteries of 
the Christian religion, and render them more present to the mind, by a 
taper, or habit, or grimace, which is suppos’d to resemble them; so 
lawyers and moralists have run into like inventions for the same reason, 
and have endeavour’d by those means to satisfy themselves concerning 
the transference of property by consent.86
Thus, Hu m e  returned in the end to his counterpoint. The rituals serve to establish on a 
“moral” level those transactions that no longer can easily be grasped by our moral 
sense, unless “help’d” in this way. The actions serve a purpose and are beneficial, and 
the rituals that underpin them, are, thus, defensible on purely utilitarian grounds. They 
serve a useful purpose. The often-encountered problem of explaining costly and time- 
consuming rituals as arising from rational behavior disappears. Rituals may well be an 
integral part of general economic equilibrium, reconfirming property rights.
Moral Forces
Thus, instrumentally useful transfers, splittings, and refinements of property rights 
need a ritual or legal underpinning to satisfy our moral sense and to generate the 
ownership effect in cases where it would not spontaneously occur. This may be costly, 
and we may loosely describe these costs as “moral costs”.87
These moral costs are “transaction costs”, i.e., costs that are necessary to run and 
maintain a certain institution. We should include them when evaluating the efficiency 
of institutions. If we take these moral costs into account, we will reduce the vagueness 
of the property rights approach in several ways. To talk about moral costs may,
85 Hu m e  (1740:515)
86 Hu m e  (1740:515-6)
87 Ku b o n -Gil k e  (forthcoming).
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however, be misleading since the moral costs that one institution has, as compared 
with another one, are moral benefits for the reverse comparison. So it seems better to 
speak about moral forces that are shaped by property rights and rituals. So let us 
briefly consider how the problems that have been mentioned above are mitigated by 
considering these moral forces.
Regarding the efficiency problem, Hu m e  has already made the point that rituals, that 
seem a waste of resources, may be important in establishing property rights. Thus, 
many apparent inefficiencies disappear. We may even understand massive and 
persistent inefficiencies. I shall give examples for this in the context of long-term 
contracting.
Regarding the unspecified set o f alternatives, the introduction of psychological 
considerations restricts, in principle, the set of feasible alternatives. This would not 
help very much, if the set of alternatives were left unspecified. Yet our earlier ideas 
about rule formation stress the principle o f good continuity. New rules and regulations 
built on the prevailing set of rules. Evolution takes place like learning. Thus, we need 
only consider the set of local alternatives to a given institution. These are the 
alternatives that can be generated by starting from the prevailing schema. This reduces 
the set of alternatives drastically, and correspondingly sharpens the thrust of the 
theoretical approach. The alternatives would involve gradual change, if new problems 
can be solved by adapting prevailing practice. They could also entail drastic change, if 
new developments require a switch to an adjacent schema of organization.88
Regarding the relevance o f property rights, it seems clear that those forms of 
organization that can do with as little ritual as possible, are preferable. In this sense, 
the commons are in fact communally owned, because this does not require the extra 
transfer of rights from the individuals to the commune and the corresponding rituals. 
Conversely, private plots are owned privately, because this does not require the 
transfer of rights from the commune to the individuals and the corresponding rituals. 
Further, social organization should exploit ownership effects in the most appropriate 
way, but this affects issues of responsibility to be discussed elsewhere.
Hu m e ’s counterpoint may in this way help to reduce ambiguities in institutional 
analysis. The following string of words generates that conclusion in a different way: 
“The allocation of property rights affects behavior; otherwise it would be irrelevant to 
consider them. The sources for this behavioral effect must be taken into account when 
we think about reshuffling property rights.” The first sentence generates a hypothesis 
by a revealed preference argument, applied to property rights theory. The second 
sentence draws the conclusion.
Long-Term Contracts and Emergent Entitlements
A prominent political scientist asserts: “One can conceive of a society in which 
haircuts took on such central social significance that communal provision would be 
morally required.”89 This seems superficial and misleading. It is superficial in the
88 See Sc h l ic h t  (in preparation: Sect. 7.6). An hypothetical example of this type of change is 
discussed in SCHLICHT (1979).
89 W a l t z e r  (1983:88n.)
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sense that one can conceive of anything if one disregards important features of reality; 
it is misleading because it suggests that ignorance is a sufficient reason for cultural 
relativism.90 A more precise formulation would be: “We do not have a theory which 
would explain how social significance emerges.”
Yet the topic is important. It seems that market systems generate systematic tensions 
in the sense that moral and instrumental considerations point in different directions. 
Hu m e ’s  counterpoint could help us to approach these problems in a serious way. 
Hu m e ’s  argument about rituals suggests that problems may emerge: Rituals exist 
because they help us morally to accept certain transfers of property rights. In 
consequence, problems would arise without these rituals. The reshuffling of property 
rights is not unproblematic.
We may, however, push this idea a little further. Consider the tension between 
prescription and the transfer of rights. It has been argued above that long 
uninterrupted possession creates property rights, and these may override previous 
ownership rights. Hence a transfer of property for long periods will create property 
rights that may be incompatible with the underlying legal ownership arrangements. 
This is precisely what has happened in the German tenancy market. The general 
perception of tenancy as something quite different from a simple exchange contract 
found articulation in an extensive tenant’s protection legislation (rent control and 
protection against eviction). By a recent ruling of the German supreme court, the 
tenancy “rights” that emerged in this manner, are protected by the clause in the 
constitution that protects property in general. Custom overrides black-letter law.
Labor legislation abounds with examples of this kind. A worker in Germany has a 
right to his job in the sense that the employer cannot replace him without good reason, 
and the incumbent workers have a right to be considered first for filling vacancies.
It may appear that the politicizing of those markets is due to their “social” importance. 
This is true. The “social importance” does not derive, however, from the intrinsic 
importance of the transactions in question. It is just another way of stating that the 
market creates customary rights that contradict the formal property rights structure, 
and this tends to bend the law. It is not related to the importance of the commodities. 
Cars are in many ways as important as work and housing. The price of most cars 
exceeds six months’ salary. Yet the car market is not controlled in a similar manner. 
Food is certainly as important as housing; yet the market for food is not controlled in 
favor of the customers.91
Hu m e ’s counterpoint makes it possible to understand some of the moral tensions that 
seem systematically to emerge in market systems. These may give rise to severe 
inefficiencies. The tenancy market may simply be ruined by such legislation.
90 W a l t z e r ’s additional remark, “that it is something more than an interesting fact that no such 
society has ever existed” cannot be empirically founded since we do not know all societies that have 
existed. It must, be a statement derived from a theory covering all societies, i.e., a universalistic 
theory, but WALTZER rejects that. Maybe his aphorism it is chic way of avoiding serious thought, 
and one should not take it too seriously.
91 It is true that the market for food is strongly politicized and regulated in the European Community, 
but this regulation works deliberately to exploit rather than protect consumers and favor the farmers 
-  a minuscule part of the population.
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Tenanted property is actually increasingly transformed into owner-occupied property 
in Germany. Similarly, the establishment of property rights in jobs may create various 
problems for the economy as a whole (while possibly being beneficial at the firm 
level).92 Yet such a development would become unavoidable if repetitive tasks 
become automated and the remaining tasks involve much firm-specific knowledge. 
The market response would be to create contracts that tie workers to firms, for 
efficiency reasons. The moral tension generated by emerging entitlements would 
follow suit. These examples illustrate that H u m e ’s  counterpoint allows us to 
understand massive inefficiencies, like the suppression of entire markets, and it may 
help to understand emerging massive market failures.
A political response could be to invest more in rituals, or actively to create a property 
rights structure that creates less difficulties while maintaining efficiency. A wrong 
response would be, however, the moralistic one of condemning the foolishness of 
people, and the destructive trends of modernism. The same tendencies of human 
nature, that create moral problems in long-term contracting, provide the moral and 
behavioral foundations for the institution of property. We cannot have one without the 
other; or, in H u m e ’s  words: “’Tis impossible to separate the good from the ill.”93
92 This is, however, a somewhat complex issue; see SCHLICHT (forthcoming)
93 Hu m e  (1740:497)
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